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MANAGING A GLOBAL NETWORK OF PLANTS

Abstract

The paper examines whether plants with different roles in a multinational network of
plants use different management systems to coordinate production and technical decisions. The
paper first tests and supports the Ferdows( 1989) technology distinctions concerning plant roles.
Following Ferdows (1989), it empirically examines the proposition that the degree of managerial
autonomy varies according to strategic role of the plant. Our findings suggest that different
plant roles require different management systems and different levels of responsibility for
decisions. Further, it shows which systems need to be differentiated if plants with different roles
are combined within the same business unit.
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A company can manage a group of plants as an international network to learn more about
technology, customers, products or processes than it would learn in one location. It may also
gain advantages in cost or flexibility of managing a group of plants as a network that it would
not achieve if these plants were managed as stand alone entities (Schmenner, 1979; 1982). One
advantage of optimizing a system of plants is that plants can specialize in activities. Along with
that specialization, plants develop roles within the system and have distinct management systems
in place to then transfer the benefits of the specialization back to the other plants in the network.
Thus there should be a "fit" between particular types of management systems which provide
integration for particular specialized plant roles.

This paper investigates whether there are

differences in management systems for plants with different roles in a network.
We first test whether distinctions based on technical activities at the plant .site as well as
access to local technology are important distinctions to make for understanding different plant
roles. These distinctions go considerably beyond the simple view that plants might differ based
on access to inputs or markets alone.

We show that these distinctions are associated with

different management systems and that the new distinctions are strongly associated with
corresponding management systems.
We also explore the nature of the fit between plant roles and management systems. Given
that systems support strategic roles, these systems may be compromised, or plants may be
managed inappropriately, if managers use a common management system throughout the
business unit to manage plants with different strategic roles. Alternatively, this suggests that if
managers know which management systems need to be different for different plant roles, they
cim differentiate the management systems within their network to match the roles of plants. We
use the empirical findings to identify the specific conflicts in management systems that occur
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when different plant types operate within the same network. These conflicts will indicate to
managers which types of management systems need to be differentiated to appropriately manage
networks of plants which include plants with different strategic roles.
While others have argued for differentiated fit in multinational firms, these arguments
have been for the headquarters-subsidiary relationship (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Gupta and
Govindarajan, 1986; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; Ghoshal and Nohria, 1989; Nohria and
Ghoshal, 1994).

The suggestion here is that while "strategic fit" may be important in the

headquarters-subsidiary relationship, this is brought about through management systems that
must be in place at the plant, and in the plant-business unit relationship. Through an empirical
assessment of the presence of fit between different management systems and plant types in
multinational firms, we seek to extend the literature on managing and controlling multinational
firms.

Theory Develop~ent
Most of what we know about differentiated fit in multinational firms follows research on
managing a network of business units within a multinational firm. This perspective emphasizes
that business units within multinational firms differ in terms of their demands for global
integration or local responsiveness. The focus is on how the linkages between business unit
managers and corporate headquarters differ according to the strategic roles of the business units
in the network. We are interested in an analysis at a lower level of the organization.
There are many conceptual articles concerning the challenges of coordinating a plant
network and the ways in which these challenges may differ in an international context (Ferdows,
1989; Flaherty, 1986; Oliff, Arpan, and Dubois, 1989). Some of these constructs are derived
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primarily in terms of material flows (Flaherty, 1986), while others describe the intended role of
the plant.

While different frameworks identify particular issues of interest to managers of

international networks, what is missing is an empirical assessment of the implications of a
framework for the management of a plant network. In particular, are plants with different roles
in such a framework managed differently? If not, it may be that common systems are used for
different plant roles, or that business units do not have plants with different roles. This might be
the case if there were no benefits of specializing plant roles or if the costs of integrating
specialized plant roles exceeded the benefits of specialization. In this case plants in a business
unit may not be managed as part of a network and plants could be seen as simply extensions of
the strategy of the business unit which might be "multidomestic" or "global" (Bartlett and
Ghoshal, 1989).
What are the management systems that are necessary for different plant roles within the
network? We want to investigate a number of questions concerning management of these plants.
First, are there some decisions which headquarters wants to control regardless of the type of
plant? Second, what is the degree of investment in management at the plant and do plants with
more management depth have greater autonomy over some production decisions than other
plants? For example, are particular decisions controlled by the plant, the plant in combination
with other plants, the plant in combination with headquarters, or are they purely in the domain of
headquarters? Third, how does autonomy over different types of production decisions vary for
plants that are located for access to inputs as opposed to access to markets? Finally, what is the
degree of autonomy over technical production decisions for plants with technical expertise at the
plant site?
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To examine how management systems might differ within a network we need to have a
clear definition of what different plant roles might be. We empirically test whether there is a
. "fit" between specific management systems and strategic plant roles in the manner suggested by
Ferdows (1989).
Ferdows (1989) developed a framework to differentiate a set of generic strategic roles for
factories in a firm's international manufacturing network. These roles are defined in terms of the
primary reason for establishment of the factory and the extent of technical activities at the site.
Reason for the site is divided into three categories: 1) Access to low cost production input
factors, 2) Use of local technological resources and 3) Proximity to market. Extent of technical
activities is classified as being either "high" or "low" (See Table 1).

Insert Table 1 about here

Hypotheses
Plant Roles Defined by Technology at the Site and Access to Local Technology. Ferdows'
framework differs from other models of factory types in its emphasis on the role of Technology
at the Plant Site and Access to Local Technology in defining plant roles. These distinctions
highlight differences in the management of technology transfer between the plant and its
business unit. The distinction between plants that need "access to local markets" and other
plants is well established in international management literature (Prahalad and Doz, 1987).
Therefore, a strong alternative typology to that of Ferdows (1989) would be that one should not
make a distinction based on technology at the plant site within the set of plants whose primary
mission is to provide access to local markets. The Ferdows (1989) distinction within this set is
between those that have a high degree of technical activities at the site and those which do not.
6

Hla (and Hlb) are phrased as alternative hypotheses to the Ferdows framework so rejecting
these hypotheses is support for the Ferdows generic roles for international factories typology.

Hla: Among plants for which access to markets is an important location factor, plants
with a high degree of technology at the site use the same management systems as
those with a low degree of technology at the site (Contributor vs. Server distinction).

Economists have long argued that firms would locate plants in order to gam access to
inexpensive inputs to production.

The alternative hypothesis to Ferdows (1989) that is

consistent with this view is that local technology is like other inputs and that there will be no
difference between plants in terms of their management systems based on whether plants are
located for Access to Local Technology.
HI b: Among plants for which access to inputs is an important location factor, there is
no difference in management systems between plants which are distinguished by the
relative importance of Access to Low Cost Inputs versus Access to Local Technology
(Source and Off-Shore versus Lead and Outpost distinction).

The above hypotheses jointly examine the

iss~e

of whether the typology proposed by

Ferdows (1989) identifies significant differences between plants in terms of the management
systems that are used in these plants. These hypotheses question whether there is a unique fit
between types of manufacturing mission and management systems. If there is a match between
plant role and management systems, one would also like to know whether the fit is the same as
that proposed by Ferdows (1989) for particular plant roles. The following sections investigate
this question.

Centralization/Decentralization in a Multinational Network. For all plants in a network
we expect headquarters to retain control over dimensions such as human resource policies for

management, long range production planning, and quality standards. The logic is that the
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headquarters has to control the human resource policies for management because these managers
belong to a 'central pool'. It can decentralize how to manage the local labor, or human resource

policies for labor, because that is a local skill issue.

But the human resource policies for

management are an important control lever that the headquarters would want to keep. Long
range production planning is essentially the same as capacity planning, and that has to be done
on a global basis if this is to be a network rather than a 'multidomestic' collection of plants each
serving a local market independently of the network (Barlett and Ghoshal, 1989).
Descriptively, we would expect that the degree of autonomy for human resource policies

for management, long range production planning, and quality standards would be lower than for
other management systems, such as production scheduling, raw material sourcing, component

sourcing, equipment sourcing, and labor human resouce policies.
Centralization/Decentralization Differences Between Types of Plants- Vertical Contrasts
in the Ferdows Framework Based on Management Depth. Since we think that headquarters will
retain control over long range production planning and human resource policies for

management we do not expect differences in autonomy on these variables between plant types.
Here we consider differences in centralization/decentralization of activities in the plant network
based on degree of management depth at the plant site that would tend to be associated with
differences due to the degree of technical activities.

In a later section, we examine vertical

differences based on the management of technical activities at the plant site.
Both Off-Shore and Server plants have managers in place who are responsible for day to
day production decisions. However, the scope of these decisions differs in each. In Off-Shore
plants, most production decisions are linked tightly to headquarters, particularly those related to

production schedules since these decisions are interdependent with other plants. The example of
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the Maquiladora plants in Mexico, which take advantage of low local wages and then export
product back to plants in the U.S., are used to illustrate this type of plant (Ferdows, 1989).
Since low cost local wages was an important reason to locate the plant to serve the rest of the
network of plants, it is likely that the headquarters will also retain some responsibility for the
form of human resource policies for labor rather than delegate them entirely to the plant. In this
case, the contrast in managerial systems that support production systems is quite clear and the
control by headquarters over such things as production schedules and human resource policies

for labor can be understood.

H2a: Source plants will differ from Off-Shore plants in their greater control over
production related decisions such as production schedules, and human resource
policies for labor.
In Server plants however, production scheduling deCisions are made primarily for the
needs of local customers and thus are not controlled by headquarters. The Server plants are
independent production platforms; soft-drink bottling plants are considered a good example of
Server plants. The managerial investment necessary for new product or process development
will be greater in Contributor than in Server plants and this could have implications for
production scheduling over new products. Thus, while we still expect greater autonomy over

production scheduling in Contributor plants than in Server plants due to their managment depth,
we do not expect this difference to be as great as the difference between Source and Off-Shore
plants. Human resource policies for labor can be an important extension of the brand image of a
company, particularly in distribution intensive industries which might be likely to utilize Server
plants. Therefore we do not think that human resource policies for labor would be delegated
entirely to Server plants and that due to the greater management depth in Contributor plants,
there would be more autonomy at these plants over human resource policies for labor.
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H2b: Contributor plants will differ from Server plants in their greater control over
decisions such as production schedules, and human resource policies for labor.
Lead plants and Outpost plants are also located for purposes of access to an input but the
input is local technology rather than other low cost inputs. In this regard, we consider the Lead
plants to have greater management depth than Outpost plants and to have a very similar contrast
to the contrast between Source and Off-Shore plants.
H2c: Lead plants will differ from Outpost plants in their greater control over
production related decisions such as production schedules, and human resource
policies for labor.

Responsibility for Coordination in the Plant-Business Unit Relationship - Horizontal
Contrasts in the Ferdows Framework. Given a common degree of technical activity at the plant
site, what are the differences in autonomy between plants that are located for Access to Markets
versus those that are located for Access to Inputs? The primary contrast between Off-Shore and
Server plants and between Source and Contributor plants involves the management of material
flows into and out of the plants, and the autonomy that comes with responsibility for serving a
market. Production schedules need to be integrated with other plants for both Off-Shore and
Source plants and so these plants will be less responsible for production schedules than plants
with similar levels of Technical Activities at the Site but are serving local markets. Nonetheless,
since the primary task of Server and Off-Shore plants is their role as production platforms rather
than product or process development, as in Contributor and Source plants, we would expect that
the contrast in autonomy over production scheduling would be greatest in the bottom row of the
Ferdows Framework, i.e. for Server plants compared to Off-Shore plants.
H3a: Server plants will differ from Off-Shore plants in their greater control over
production schedules than Off-Shore plants.

10

H3b: Contributor plants will differ from Source plants in their greater control over
production schedules than Source plants.

Off-Shore and Source plants are located to take advantage of unique access to inputs, and
therefore we would expect these plants to be responsible for decisions regarding important inputs
into production.

When comparing each to its counterpart with a similar level of technical

activities at the plant site, we would expect Off-Shore plants to have more control over inputs
such as raw material sourcing, component sourcing, and human resource policies for labor than
Server plants. In addition, we expect Source plants to have more control over inputs such as raw

material sourcing, component sourcing, and human resource policies for labor than Contributor
plants

H3c: Off-Shore plants will differ from Server plants in their greater control over raw
material sourcing, component sourcing, and human resource policies for labor.
H3d: Source plants will differ from Contributor plants in their greater control over
raw material sourcing, component sourcing, and human resource policies for labor.

Responsibility for Coordination in the Plant-Business Unit Relationship - Vertical
Contrasts in the Ferdows Framework Based on Management of Technical Activities. According
to Ferdows (1989), the Off-Shore factories are characterized by minimal management
investment, no engineering work, day to day procurement, and management systems are
designed solely for reporting to headquarters. The Off-Shore and Outpost factories are most
similar to the Server factories in terms of their absence of this managerial investment in
technical activities. In all three, managerial investment is kept solely at the level needed for dayto-day management of the plant.
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In contrast, production decisions concerning raw material sourcing, component sourcing,
and equipment sourcing might require the ability to make changes in processes or products at the
plant.

Thus autonomy for these decisions would probably be greatest in plants that have

technical activities at the plant site.

Global (as opposed to multidomestic) companies

increasingly want to have global quality standards to support a global brand image and a global
corporate image.

The autonomy and responsibility for setting those standards would also

probably be greatest in plants with technical activities at the site.
We will compare Source versus. Off-Shore, and Contributor versus Server, and Lead
versus Outpost on the following four dimensions: raw material sourcing, component sourcing,

equipment sourcing and quality standards. All four dimensions are related to technical activities
in the sense in that one needs technical activities on site in order to be able to responsibly
exercise autonomy. Therefore, we expect Source, Contributor and Lead plants to enjoy more
autonomy on these dimensions.
H4a: Source plants will differ from Off-Shore plants, in their greater emphasis on
management systems that support responsibility and autonomy over technical
decisions. These include systems such as raw material sourcing, component sourcing,
equipment sourcing, and quality standards.
H4b: Contributor plants will differ from Server plants, in their greater emphasis on
management systems that support responsibility and autonomy beyond day-to-day
production decisions. These include systems such as raw materials, component
sourcing, equipment sourcing, and quality standards.
H4c: Lead plants will differ from Outpost plants, in their greater emphasis on
management systems that support responsibility and autonomy beyond day-to-day
production decisions. These include systems such as raw materials, component
sourcing, equipment sourcing, and quality standards.
While not explicitly a "vertical" comparison in the Ferdows framework, the framework
does consider Lead plants to have a higher degree of technical activities at the site than
Contributor and Source plants (Ferdows, 1989:Figure 2).
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Lead factories may be the sole

producer of key products of components for the business unit or may initiate new technologies
that are not dependent on interactions with suppliers or customers but may be more dependent
on interaction with the business unit R&D headquarters.

Production is in some sense

subordinate to innovation in Lead plants, and innovation may be in part controlled by
headquarters personnel.

Still, the Lead plant will have the most managerial autonomy on

technical decisions that relate to the ability to develop and produce new products and processes.
While we compare Lead plants to Source and Contributor plants, this comparison is similar to a
vertical comparison in that the difference between Lead plants and these plants is that Lead
plants have even greater control and autonomy with regard to technical activities.
H5: Lead plants will differ from Source and from Contributor plants in their greater
control over raw material sourcing, equipment sourcing, component sourcing and
quality standards.

Methods
Model Specification
Our sample consists of 157 manufacturing plants from multinational firms operating
throughout the world. Out of 209 plants we are able to identify 157 plants that are distributed
into all six of the strategic role categories of Ferdows (1989): i) Source (22), ii) Off-Shore (8),
iii) Lead (40), iv) Outpost (3), v) Contributor (61) and vi) Server (23). We want to determine if
there are differences in means by plant type with respect to responsibility for the coordination of
management systems.
If many different variables are correlated with one another then even though there are
differences in the means of management system variables, there may not be sufficient
differences between these variables as a group to still think of the two types of plants as
requiring "different" management systems on all these dimensions.
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We therefore use a

multinomial logit analysis to test for these differences in management systems between plants
with different roles.

The multinomial logit model estimates whether the group of variables

measuring particular management systems uniquely determine the type of plant. In addition, the
logit model tests for consistency of results with the differences in means analysis.
The dependent choice variable represents whether the plant is a Source, Lead, Server, or
Contributor plant. There are insufficient cases of Outpost and Off-Shore plants in our data set to
include these plant roles in the logit model. We consider the plant-business unit coordination
relationship in order to determine the types of management systems that are consistent with each
plant strategic role. By plant - business unit coordination relationship we are concerned with the .
level of responsibility for coordinating production and technical decisions affecting the plant
facility.

Plant Strategic Role

=

f (plant-business unit coordination relationship)

The model takes the form:

for j=O, 1,2,3

where:

Yi =
Xi
~

the strategic role for plant i

=

a vector of management systems characteristics of the plant - business unit

=

a vector of estimated parameters.

The explanatory variables vary by observation (plant) and are constant across choices
(strategies), therefore, the form of the model requires that it be estimated relative to a
normalizing alternative, that is, for one choice, the ~ coefficient vector is set equal to zero.
Since there are four choices, (the Outpost and Off-Shore choices must be dropped due to
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insufficient observations) the model must be estimated three times to obtain all pair-wise
comparisons of interest. In the Contributor relative to Server case for example, each estimated

~

parameter represents the effect of the corresponding explanatory variable on the probability of
the plant strategic role being a Contributor relative to it being Server.

Joint Test of Hypotheses 1a and lb. We use a nested test of multinomial logit models to
test Hypotheses 1a and 1b. These hypotheses examine whether the Ferdows (1989) typology
adds significantly to our understanding of the need to differentiate management systems by plant
types. We are essentially comparing a model with two choices to a model with four choices.
Our sample only allows us to consider four of the six generic roles of plants in an international
network: Source, Contributor, Server and Lead factories.
Fortunately, we can still test the distinctions made by Ferdows (1989). In the two-choice
model, plants are differentiated only by the relative importance of Access to Inputs versus
Proximity to Markets as the Primary Strategic Reasons for the Site. In the four-choice model,
Access to Local Technology is added as a third category. A second dimension is also added
based on the Extent of Technical Activities at the Plant Site. We use a joint test of Hypotheses
1a and 1b since Ferdows' uses both distinctions simultaneously inthe framework.

We developed a method for a comparison of the explanatory power of the four-choice
model (Source, Lead, Contributor, Server) that corresponds to the technology distinctions made
by Ferdows, to a simpler two-choice model (Source and Lead, Contributor and Server). A log
likelihood test is appropriate; however, to use this test, the logit models must be nested (BenAkiva and Lerman, 1985). One can not estimate two-choice and four-choice models separately
and compare their log likelihood statistics. To create the required nesting, the two-choice model
must be represented as a constrained four-choice model (Greene, 1986). That is, the Source and
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Lead alternatives are constrained to have the same coefficients and the Contributor and Server
alternatives are constrained to have the same coefficients. Furthermore, these coefficients must
be the same as those estimated in the two choice model. The resulting log likelihood value is
then compared to that of the freely estimated (unconstrained) four-choice model using a log
likelihood test. This tests Hypotheses 1a and 1b jointly.

Data and Sample Description
The data used in this analysis

IS

from the Global Manufacturing Network Survey

conducted by Professors Brian Talbot and Aneel Karnani of the Graduate School of Business
Administration at the University of Michigan. The purpose of this survey was to assemble a
comprehensive database containing a variety of data regarding the configuration and operation
of international manufacturing plant networks. The survey was administered in 1991 to plant
managers in many countries representing 73 companies whose headquarters are located
primarily in the U.S., Europe, and Japan. The plants they manage tend to be plants of large
multinational firms that have been engaged in international manufacturing for a long time. All
firms involved in the survey had sent managers to the Global Leadership Executive Management
Program at University of Michigan, and thereby demonstrated an interest in and concern for
education on management of international manufacturing enterprises. The response rate was
exceptionally high (above 90%) for this reason.

Variables
Plants were classified into the 6 categories defined by Ferdows (1989)

In

terms of the

primary strategic reason for the site and technical activities at the site. The items used to classify
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different plant roles can be seen in Table 2 and the explanation for how these items are used is
explained in Appendix 1.

Insert Table 2 about here

Explanatory variables in the model include measures of the types of management systems
for coordination of materials, production and technical decisions between the plant and other
parts of the company.

On each type of decision the question is "Who has the primary

responsibility for the following tasks for your plant?". There is a 5 point scale in which "your
plant" is 5, "your plant in coordination with another plant" is 4, "another plant" is 3, "regional
headquarters" is 2, "worldwide headquarters" is 1, and "don't know/not sure" is O.

The

decisions considered are the following: long range production plans, production, schedules, raw

material sourcing, component sourcing, equipment sourcing, quality standards, human resource
policies for management, and human resource policies for labor.

Empirical Findings
There is broad support for the Ferdows (1989) framework in our joint test of HI a and
Hlb. The alternative hypotheses to the Ferdows' framework are rejected (Table 3). Clearly, the
novel distinctions in the framework pertaining to technology are important for understanding the
differentiation of management systems within plants. More specifically, for plants that consider
access to markets an important location factor, the distinction between whether there are
technological activities at the plant is not unimportant for understanding their management
systems.
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For HI b, among those plants for which access to inputs is an important factor, the
distinction between technological inputs and other inputs is not unimportant for understanding
management systems at the plant. The nested log likelihood test of whether these distinctions
should be made indicates that the two choice model of distinguishing only on the basis of
markets and inputs is not significantly different than the null hypothesis which is making no
distinction at all.
The four choice model which tests whether one should make. the distinction between
Source and Lead plants (HIa) and between Contributor and Server plants (HIb) clearly indicates
that this model fits better than the model in which these distinctions are not made (significant at
95% confidence level). We conclude from this test that one should use the four-choice model.
This supports the use of the two technology related dimensions which Ferdows (1989) used.
Next we consider the more specific hypotheses related to "fit" of management systems to
particular plant roles.

Insert Table 3 about here

CentralizationlDecentralization: Descriptive Findings. In Table 4 the first 8 rows relate to
management systems, and the numbers represent the degree of autonomy (or decentralization)
that the plants enjoy on that particular dimension.

The first column is the degree of

decentralization on each dimension in the entire sample of plants (in multinational
manufacturing companies). We expected human resource policies for management, long range

production planning, and quality standards to be the least centralized (smallest numbers), and
that is, in fact, empirically true! Headquarters has to control the human resource policies for
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management because these managers belong to a 'central pool' and are a control lever that it
needs to retain. In addition, headquarters retains control over long range production on a global
basis.

This allows headquarters to manage its plants as a network rather than as a

'multidomestic' colection of plants each serving a local market independently. Finally, global (as
opposed to multidomestic) companies increasingly want to have global quality standards to
support a global brand image and a global corporate image and there is a high degree of control
retained by headquarters for quality standards. Similarly, we expected production scheduling
and human resource policies for labor to be very decentralized -- and they are.
If one takes an average of the eight rows in Table 4, that can be considered to be an index

of the overall autonomy of a plant, or Index of Autonomy, which is the last row. For reasons of
both management depth and the availability of technical activities, we would expect Source
plants to be more autonomous than Off-Shore plants, and they are: 3.81 vs. 3.25. Similarly, we
would expect Contributor plants to be more autonomous than Server plants, and they are: 3.60
vs. 3.39. Similarly, we would expect Lead plants to be more autonomous than Outpost plants,
and they are: 3.4 vs 3.08. Though the differences in means support the idea of greater autonomy
in the plants above the vertical in the Ferdows' framework, these differences are not statistically
significant at the 90% confidence level.

Centralization/Decentralization Differences Between Types of Plants- Vertical Contrasts
in the Ferdows Framework Based on Management Depth. We expected Source plants to have
greater control over production scheduling and human resource policies for labor than OffShore plants due to their greater management depth. There is support for H2a that Source plants
will have greater control over production scheduling than Off-Shore plants (Table 5). Source
plants take more control over production scheduling than the Off-Shore plants.
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This is

consistent with the relative absence of administrative control at Off-Shore plants when compared
to Source plants and the importance of supply integration of Off-Shore plants with other plants.
Autonomy for production scheduling is also greater for Contributor than for Server plants and
Lead plants than for Outpost plants but these differences are not significant. The problem may
be that production scheduling is so decentralized to begin with in the entire sample (values are at
4.00 or above for all types of plants in Table 4) that the empirical results cannot detect subtle
differences between types of plants.
As expected, there is more control over human resource policies for labor in Source plants
than in Off-Shore plants but this finding is not significant. This is also true for Contributor
plants compared to Server plants (Table 5) and for Lead plants compared to Outpost plants
(Table 4). This could be because all plants must control some elements of their human resource

policies for labor and would thus have some autonomy over this decision.

The prevalent

decentralization of some part of this decision could make distinctions about the degree of central
control by headquarters hard to identify with statistical significance.

Responsibility for Coordination in the Plant-Business Unit Relationship - Horizontal
Contrasts in the Ferdows Framework. . As expected in H3a, there is greater control over
production scheduling in Server plants than in Off-Shore plants, but this difference is not
significant. Server plants have more autonomy with respect to their output decisions since they
are serving their own market rather than other plants in a network. Again, the difference is in
the direction expected but the insignificant findings could be due to the predominantly
decentralized decisions concerning production scheduling.
Contrary to our expectations in H3b, Contributor plants have less control over production

scheduling than Source plants but this relationship is not significant.
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The additional

responsibilities of Contributor plants beyond production could moderate the autonomy of

production scheduling in this type of plant and may be related to the somewhat lower degree of
autonomy at Contributor plants than at Source plants.
We expected the plants with more control over inputs would have greater autonomy with
respect to raw material sourcing, component sourcing, and human resource policies for labor.
There are no significant differences in the means between Off-Shore plants and Server plants,
though, as expected, there is more autonomy over raw material sourcing and component

sourcing in Off-Shore plants than in Server plants (H3c). Despite this support for H3c there is
also counter evidence that there is more control over human resource policies for labor in Server
plants (H3c). It is possible that raw material sourcing and component sourcing are more unique
input problems for Off-Shore plants, while human resource policies for labor can have
important implications for serving a market, particularly if there is a service dimension to the
manufacturing industry such as distribution.
While not significant, there is higher autonomy for key input decisions in Source plants
than in Contributor plants as expected. There is more plant level control over raw material

sourcing, component sourcing and human resource policies for labor in Source plants than in
Contributor plants, though the difference is essentially zero for human resource policies for

labor.
Responsibility for Coordination in the Plant-Business Unit Relationship - Vertical
Contrasts in the Ferdows Framework Based on Management of Technical Activities. In H4, we
expected greater autonomy for plants in the upper row of the Ferdows Framework with regard to
management decisions involving technical expertise, such as raw material sourcing, component

sourcing, equipment sourcing, and quality standards. For Source plants compared to Off-Shore
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plants (H4a), there is greater autonomy at Source plants for all four technically related
managerial decisions.

Only quality standards has a marginally significant difference in the

greater autonomy for Source plants (Table 5).
In H4b, we also expected Contributor plants to have greater autonomy than Server plants
with regard to technical decisions. Again, in all four of these decisions there is considerably
more autonomy for the plant in the top row of the framework, the Contributor plant. We find
significant evidence to support this hypothesis that Contributor plants are more likely to be
responsible for component sourcing and for quality standards than are Server plants. There is
support here in both differences in means by plant type and in the logit model contrasts (Tables
4, 5 and 6). (The logit model contrast is not available for Source vs. Off-Shore). This finding
that there are differences in management systems for plants with different levels of technology at
the site is fairly robust and indicative of the management challenges at these different types of
plants.
There is greater autonomy for Lead plants compared to Outpost plants with regard to raw

material sourcing and equipment sourcing (H4c), however their is less autonomy with regard to
equipment sourcing and quality standards. None of these differences are significant and due to
the very small sample size for Outpost plants (3), these findings are highly unreliable.

Insert Table 4, 5, and 6 about here

We also expected that Lead plants would differ from Source and Contributor plants in
their greater control over raw material sourcing, equipment sourcing, component sourcing, and
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quality standards (H5).

We found that Lead plants were less autonomous on all of these

dimensions than both Source and Contributor plants. We found significantly less control over
component sourcing and equipment sourcing in Lead plants than in Contributor plants (Table 5).
We also found significantly less control over component sourcing in Lead plants than in Source
plants (Table 5). This suggests equipment sourcing and component sourcing decisions may be
shared with R&D facilities for unique products made by Lead plants while the more standard
equipment sourcing done by Contributor and Source plants may be delegated directly to those
plants.
While this finding counters the idea of the Lead plant as a plant with "absolute" control
over important long term production related decisions, it is also possible that this reflects an
interdependence with business unit headquarters or other plants in terms of product and process
development that is less present in Source and Contributor plants.

Conclusions and Limitations
We utilize the Ferdows (1989) typology and find it to be a useful device for organizing
information about differences in management systems between plants with different roles in an
international network. We have tested whether management systems are different for different
plants in two ways. In hypothesis 1a and 2a we tried to reject the hypotheses that a simpler
typology than the Ferdows typology would do just as well at differentiating management
systems among plants. It was found that the distinctions based on technical activity at the plant,
and the importance of local technology were important ones for understanding the different
management systems used in international plants.

This is a test which uses all of the

management systems together to determine whether, as a group, plants with different roles are
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managed with sufficiently different systems that these systems could be used to differentiate
between plant types. The answer is that they can. The second way we have tested for different
management systems is to· test more specific hypotheses about the "fit" of particular
management systems to plant roles.
The framework is particularly successful in contrasting management systems for plants
that are required to develop manufacturing capabilities involving technical expertise with those
that are primarily production platforms. The control over quality standards and component

sourcing at Contributor plants when compared to Server plants is indicative of the greater
management responsibility taken by the management of plants that have greater technical
activities at the plant location.
We expected production decisions involving technical choices to be controlled more by
Lead plants than by Contributor or Source plants. But these decisions did not differ between the
types of plants as we, and Ferdows, expected. While we were generally correct in expecting
more control over these decisions for Contributor plants compared to Server plants, and Source
plants compared to Off-Shore plants, we attributed· too much control over these technical
production decisions to Lead plants.

We suspect that the autonomy over non-technical

production decisions due to greater management depth, which was shown to be greater at Source
plants than for example at Off-Shore plants, also carries over to some of these technical
production decisions such as raw material sourcing and component sourcing when Source plants
are compared to Lead plants. Similarly, when Lead plants are compared to Contributor plants
the Contributor plants retain more autnonomy over component sourcing and equipment sourcing.
Lead plants may be making decisions related to raw material sourcing, equipment sourcing and
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component sourcing in combination with business unit R&D while Contributor and Source
plants are freed from this constraint.
Which management systems need to be differentiated if different plants are combined in
the same plant network? Table 5 indicates that one could combine Contributor and Server plants
in the same network if it is not costly to differentiate management systems on production
decisions involving technical choices within the subsidiary such as component sourcing and

quality standards. Quality standards, as well as production sheduling systems would have to be
differentiated if Source and Off-Shore plants are combined. One might also think of the need to
manage cooperation between these plants for such things as quality standards that are developed
in Source and Contributor plants for use in Off-Shore and Server plants respectively.
There are few systems which must be differentiated when combining Contributor and
Source or Server and Off-Shore plants.

Likewise, Lead plants can be combined with

Contributor or Source plants if it is not costly to allow for the reduced autonomy over technical
decisions such as component sourcing and equipment sourcing in Lead plants. As stated earlier,
it is likely that this requires explicit dependence on business unit R&D facilities in Lead plants
which would not be as necessasary in Contributor and Source plants. What are the implications
for headquarters -subsidiary relationships and the IntegrationlResponsiveness Grid (Prahalad and
Doz, 1989)? Differentiated fit not only has implications for consistent management systems
within the business unit but also has implications for the operations and management of plants
within a network.
We have put the Ferdows (1989) generic roles for international factories through multiple
screens.

We have shown that it 'explains differences in management systems used in

international plants better than a more naive model that doesn't make the distinctions based on
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technology that are put forth by Ferdows. We next examine the model to determine whether
there is evidence for the particular characteristics of plant roles that he described. In many cases
these characteristics are present though we have discussed. some exceptions. In general however,
there is strong evidence that management systems are different for different plant roles and that
undifferentiated management systems at the business unit level for different plant will result in
the inability for these plants to pursue their roles effectively.
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Table 1
Generic Roles of International Factories (Ferdows, 1989)
p.
OReason f or the Solte
nmary S trateglc

Extent of

Access to Low Cost

Use of Local

Proximity

Production Input

Technological

to Market

Factors

Resources

High

Source

Lead

Contributor

Low

Off-Shore

Outpost

Server

Technical
Activities at Site
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Table 2
Questions used to Identify Plants Within the Ferdows Framework for the Generic Roles of
International Factories (Ferdows, 1989)

·Reason f or th·e S·Ite
nma rv S trategIc

Extent of

Access to Low Cost

Use of Local

Proximity

Production Input

Technological

to Market

Factors

Resources

High

Source

Lead

Contributor

Low

Off-Shore

Outpost

Server

Technical
Activities at site.

Access to:

Access to:

Proximity to:

product design

-low cost labor

-local technology

-important markets

process design

-raw materials

-skilled labor

-key customers

-energy

-advanced infrastructure

original:

changes in:
product design

-key suppliers

process design
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Table 3

. Joint Test of Hla and H1b
Logit Model
4 - Choice
(Source, Lead, Contributor & Server)

2 - Choice
(Source, Lead, Contributor & Server)

Model Statistics
II.

Log Likelihood (~) = -173.62
Log Likelihood (0) = -189.17
X2 (d.f. = 27-3 = 24) = 31.101 (p<.15)
II.

Log Likelihood (~) = -97.18
Log Likelihood (0) = -99.54
X2 (d.f. = 9-1 = 8) = 4.7144 (p>.25)

Nested Logit Test
Log Likelihood

4 - Choice Constrained Model
(Source & Lead have some coefficients)
(Contributor & Server have some coefficients)

X2 = -2[-199.3046 - (-173.6182)] = 51.37 (p<.005)
(d.f. = 27-18=9)
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(~)

= -173.62

Table 4
Management Systems Variable Means by Generic Roles of International Plant Types
Lower Numbers Mean Less Autonomy Over Decisions by the Plant
Entire
Sample
n=157

Source
n=22

Contributor
n=61

Lead
n=40

Off-Shore
n=8

Outpost
n=3

Server
n=23

Long Range Production
Planning

3.21

3.50

3.26

2.90

2.50

2.33

3.70

Production Scheduling

4.55

4.86

4.62

4.38

4.13

4.00

4.57

Raw Material Sourcing

3.52

3.86

3.57

3.30

3.75

2.67

3.43

Component Sourcing

3.69

4.14

3.93

3.38

3.75

2.67

3.26

Equipment Sourcing

4.13

4.27

4.33

3.83

3.63

5.00

4.04

Quality Standards
Human Resource
Policies for
Management
Human Resource
Policies for Labor
Index of Autonomy
(Mean of above)

2.99

3.23

3.21

3.18

2.38

3.67

1.96

2.58

2.55

2.59

2.70

2.5

1.33

2.57

3.80

4.05

4.03

3.58

3.38

3.00

3.61

3.56

3.81

3.69

3.41

3.25

3.08

3.39

Management System
Variables

-
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Table 5
Differences of Means of Management Systems in Multinational Plant Types
Management
System
Determinants
Long Range
Production
Planning
Production
Scheduling
Raw Material
Sourcing
Component
Sourcing
Equipment

(For A vs B , Mean of A minus Mean of B)
Source
Contrib- Lead vs.
Lead
Lead vs.
vs.Offutor vs.
vs.
Source
ContribShore
Server
Outpost
utor
1.00/\
-0.43
-0.60
0.57
-0.36

Contributor vs.
Source
-0.24

Server
vs.OffShore
1.20*

0.74**

0.06

-0.49*

0.37

-0.25

-0.24

0.44

0.11

0.14

-0.56/\

0.63

-0.27

-0.29

-0.32

0.39

0.67*

-0.76*

0.72

-0.56*

-0.20

-0.49

0.65

0.29

-0.45

-1.17

-0.50*

0.06

0.42

0.85/\

1.26**

-0.05

-0.48

-0.04

-0.01

-0.42

0.05

0.03

0.16

1.37/\

0.11

0.05

0.07

0.67

0.43

-0.47

0.-58

-0.46/\

-0.01

0.23

Sourcing
Quality
Standards
Human
Resource
Policies for
Management
Human
Resource
Policies for
Labor
Significance:
***
>99%
**
>95%
>90%
*
/\
> 80%

Tests
Assume
Pop.
Variance
Equal
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Table 6

Logit Model of Management Systems in Multinational Plant Types

Management System
Determinants

Contributor
vs. Server

Lead vs.
Source

Lead vs.
Contributor

Contributor
vs.Source

Constant
Long Range Production
Planning

-1.05

4.29*

1.40

2.89

-0.42**

-0.09

-0.02

0.08

Production Scheduling

0.13

-0.52

-0.08

-0.44

Raw Material Sourcing

-0.37"

0.01

0.15

-0.14

Component Sourcing

0.45**

-0.23

-0.23"

0.00

Equipment Sourcing

0.19

-0.05'

-0.23

0.18

0.49***

0.05

0.05

0.01

-0.13

0.24

0.20"

0.04

0.24

-0.19

-0.22"

0.03

Quality Standards
Human Resource Policies for
Management
Human Resource Policies for
Labor
T-stat
***
**
*

"

>2.58 for 99%
>1.96 for 95%
> 1.65 for 90%
> 1.28 for 80%

Log Likelihood
Log Likelihood
Chi-Squared (24)
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-173.62
n=146
(0)
-189.17
31.10, signif. at 85%.
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Appendix 1
Classification Scheme Used for Classifying Plants Into Discrete Strategic Roles
For classifying plants into discrete plant roles we used responses to the question: "To What
degree did the following factors influence your plant's location decision?" Plants that had a high
value on "access to raw materials", "access to low-cost labor", or "access to energy" or "access
to key suppliers" were deemed to have Access to Low Cost Production Input Factors as their
primary strategic mission. Likewise, plants with a high value on "access to local technology",
"access to skilled labor" or "access to advanced infrastructure" were considered to have Use of
Local Technological Resources as their primary strategic mission. Finally plants that said
"proximity to important markets", or "proximity to key customers" were considered to have
"proximity to market" as their key strategic reason for the site. Responses to these questions
were compared in terms of the highest score for any item in a group. Ties were settled by
comparing the average score for the items in each group (See Table 2).
To determine the Extent of Technical Activities at the Site, responses to the following
questions were used. The question was, "Who has the primary responsibility for the following
tasks for your plant?" Possible answers included "your plant", "your plant in combination with
another plant", "another plant", "regional headquarters", "worldwide headquarters" and "don't
know/ not sure". Answers which were either "your plant" or "your plant in coordination with
another plant" were given a "1". Others were given "0". The four items that were considered
were "original product design, "product design changes", "original process design" and "process
design changes". If "1", then the plant was considered to have a high level of Technical
Activities at the Site (See Table 2).
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